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Controversy over Buddhist Ethical Reform:
A Secular Critique of Clerical Authority in the Tibetan
Blogosphere
Holly Gayley

This article explores the online debate in
the Tibetan-language blogosphere over a
burgeoning ethical reform movement. Annually,
whole villages and clans in nomadic areas along
the eastern reaches of the Tibetan plateau
are committing to a n wly formulated set of
ten Buddhist virtues that include vows not
to sell yaks for slaughter, not to fight with
weapons, and not to drink, smoke, or gamble.
Spearheaded by Khenpo Tsultrim Lodrö and
cleric-scholars at Larung Buddhist Academy
in Serta, concerned with the erosion of social
values in the face of state modernization
policies, novel vow ceremonies have generated
a new level of commitment to Buddhist ethics
among Tibetan nomads in the region while
spawning controversy over the role of religion
in the public sphere.
A set of virulent critiques of ethical reform
have appeared since 2012 in Tibetan blog
posts by well-known intellectuals like Jamyang
Kyi and Notreng. This article examines the
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secular terms through which clerical authority
is criticized in the Tibetan blogosphere and
several responses that address the polarizing
tendency of online debate due to the circulation
of misinformation and slander. How is the
Tibetan blogosphere creating a new public
forum for the secular critique of religion? On
what grounds are Tibetan bloggers challenging
Buddhist clerical authority online? How do
monastics and their supporters advocate, in
response, for the role of Buddhism in governing
Tibetan social values?
Keywords: Buddhist ethics, Tibetan blogosphere,
anticlericalism, religion and media, Larung Buddhist Academy.

Introduction
The immediacy of digital media means that compelling
events, as shared through anecdotes and images, can be
diffused rapidly and engender lively online debate. Since
the mid-2000s, when the Internet became more readily
accessible in Tibetan areas of China, the Tibetan-language
blogosphere has emerged as a public space in which to
share views outside of official channels and discuss issues
of Tibetan identity, culture and politics—albeit in coded
ways for sensitive topics.1 Needless to say, this public space
is circumscribed by the omnipresence of state control in
regulating cultural productions and political discourse
and by the ‘great firewall’ of China which tends to block
exile Tibetan blogs and news websites,2 even as Tibetans
in the diaspora have access to blogging websites based in
China and participate in blogosphere debates over events
happening on the Tibetan plateau.3 While the Internet has
provided a platform for Buddhist leaders and institutions
on the Tibetan plateau to reach large audiences, especially
among Chinese speakers,4 it has also created a significant
Tibetan-language forum on independent blogging websites
for educated Tibetans, lay and monastic, to debate the role
of religion in society. Heidi Campbell highlights the importance of the blogosphere in considering the ways that
religious authority is both challenged and affirmed online
(2010), querying the extent to which the Internet serves
a democratizing or leveling function, i.e. giving voice to
those marginalized within traditional hierarchies. In this
article, I take up Campbell’s call to explore “how and why
members of different groups challenge or strengthen a
particular type of religious authority online” and the “larger question of the role technology plays in the process”
(2010: 273).
As a case study, I focus on a heated and protracted debate
over a burgeoning ethical reform movement inaugurated
in 2008 by cleric-scholars at Larung Buddhist Academy, the
largest and most influential monastic institution on the
Tibetan plateau, located in Serta County along the border of Sichuan and Qinghai Provinces.5 In the wake of the
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), once religious practice
was again publicly allowed in China, a handful of Buddhist
leaders in Serta began bestowing ethical precepts during
the 1980s and 90s in ad-hoc fashion on ritual occasions
or as an ethical code specific to their monastery 6 At that
point, ethical reform could be considered a relatively
minor facet of the broader movement to reconstitute Buddhist teachings, practices and institutions in the post-Mao
era, which was taking place amid wide-ranging cultural
revitalization efforts. Yet its significance increased over
time. Larung founder Khenpo Jigmé Phuntsok (Mkhan po
‘Jigs med phun tshogs), a towering figure in the revitaliz -

tion of Buddhism on the Tibetan plateau, linked Buddhist
ethics to the larger project of preserving Tibetan culture in
a landmark work of advice to the laity, titled Heart Advice to
Tibetans for the 21st Century (composed in 1995).7 Video footage from the late 1990s and early 2000s shows him bestowing vows to large-scale gatherings of thousands of Tibetan
nomads raising their hands to indicate their commitment
to one or another precept.8 Ethical reform has taken on a
new urgency and further systematization in the wake of
the largely peaceful protests that swept across the Tibetan
plateau in 2008, China’s Olympic year.9
A new set of ‘ten virtues’ (dge bcu) was promulgated by
Larung Buddhist Academy in 2008 and subsequently spread
through mass vow-taking ceremonies among whole villages and clans in surrounding nomadic areas.10 As an adaptation of the traditional ten Buddhist virtues, the new ten
virtues combine elements of a temperance movement with
an orientation toward non-violence. The new ten virtues
consist of precepts not to sell livestock for slaughter, not
to steal, not to fight with weapons, not to consort with
prostitutes, not to sell weapons or drugs, not to smoke,
not to drink, not to gamble, not to hunt, and not to wear
animal fur on the trim of traditional Tibetan coats.11 This
list represents a significant variation on the traditional
ten Buddhist virtues, which proscribe actions on three levels—physical (killing, stealing, sexual misconduct), verbal
(lying, harsh speech, slander, idle chatter) and mental acts
(ill will, covetousness, wrong view)—through there is some
overlap in precepts at the physical level.12 While the traditional ten virtues are closely tied to an individual’s prospects for rebirth, the new ten virtues and associated vows
address contemporary social problems, such as the loss of
family wealth in a recent upsurge in gambling, the threat
of AIDS due to increasing prostitution, and fighting over
grazing rights on the grasslands since decollectivization.13
For this reason, the conception and diffusion of the new
ten virtues can be regarded as a constructive approach to
the corrosive effects of rapid social change due to a host of
factors, including state modernization and marketization
policies.
In discussing blogosphere debates over ethical reform in
this article, I refer specifically to the new ten virtues pr mulgated by Larung Buddhist Academy, which have spread
since 2008 through mass vow-taking ceremonies in counties near Serta, primarily in Kandze Prefecture of Sichuan
Province.14 In doing so, I follow Tibetans bloggers who
reference the ‘ten virtues’ in relation to Larung Buddhist
Academy, Serta, and/or Khenpo Tsultrim Lodrö (Mkhan
po Tshul khrims blo gros), the main architect of ethical
reform and one of Jigmé Phuntsok’s principal successors
at Larung Buddhist Academy.15 To complicate matters,
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however, the method of implementation for the new ten
virtues varies widely, since it has been left up to local monasteries to oversee the vows in their affiliated villages and
clans (sde ba, tsho ba),16 including tracking violations and
enforcing punishments. Complicating matters further, the
Monastic Association (Dge ‘dun mthun tshogs) in Serta—constituted in 2010 to deal with a variety of monastic issues
including ethical reform—formulated its own revision of
the new ten virtues in 2013 for the thirty monasteries in
Serta County.17 When discussing the ten virtues, then, one
has to ask which ten virtues: the traditional precepts from
Buddhist canonical sources, the new ten virtues promulgated in 2008 by Larung Buddhist Academy, ad-hoc ethical
precepts bestowed by Buddhist leaders and monasteries,
or the revised ten virtues from 2013 being implemented by
the Monastic Association in Serta County? The conflation
of these has led to some confusion and misinformation on
Tibetan-language blogs.18 Even though the vows and their
enforcement are supervised by local monastic authorities,
blogosphere critiques tend to focus on the more visible and
well-known figure, Tsultrim Lodrö
The Secular Terms of Debate
The online debate over the new ten virtues erupted on
multiple blogging websites in two major phases, sparked by
events reported through anecdotes and images published
online in November 2012 and August 2013 respectively.
The first phase began with reports of monasteries enacting
fines for violations of the new ten virtues and refusing
funerary services to the families of violators. The second
phase was set in motion by provocative photos of a public
confession ceremony, which turned out to have no direct
connection to Larung Buddhist Academy or the new ten
virtues. By November 2013, Tibet Web Digest called the
new ten virtues one of the most hotly debated topics
on the Tibetan blogosphere during the previous year.19
Drawing further attention to the issue, High Peaks, Pure
Earth provided a translation into English of one of the key
opinion pieces in the debate by Jamyang Kyi (‘Jam dbyangs
skyid), a former newscaster who became a popular singer,
feminist writer, and avid blogger, in which she champions
the role of the secular intellectual in calling for freedom
at times of religious dogmatism and repression.20 Here
I examine fifteen opinion pieces on the topic from the
following Tibetan-language blogging websites: Sangdhor
(Seng rdor dra ba, www.sangdhor.com) which has since
been closed, Amdo Tibet Blog (Mtsho sngon po zin bris, blog.
amdotibet.cn), New Youth Network (Gzhon gsar dra ba,
tbnewyouth.com), Gendun Chöpel Literary Network (Dge
‘dun chos ‘phel rtsom rig dra ba, www.gdqpzhx.com), and
the exile-based Khabdha (Kha brda, www.khabdha.org)
24 | HIMALAYA Spring 2016

which is officially blocked in China. Cumulatively, there
were approximately 25,000 visitors and/or readers for
these opinion pieces in the Tibetan-language blogosphere
and almost a thousand comments, with individual posts
on the topic typically garnering between one and two
thousand visits—a substantial number by standards on
the Tibetan blogosphere.21 Generally-speaking, bloggers
and commenters include Tibetans who have received a
secular education in minority universities (minzu daxue)
in China, monastics or former-monks who pursued a
traditional education in the monastery, and Tibetans
educated and living abroad—remembering the caveat that
exile readers have more access to the blog posts of those
inside China than vice versa. Despite the locus of ethical
reform being northern Kham, mainly Kandze Prefecture
of Sichuan Province, it has generated interest among
Amdo writers based in Xining, the capital of Qinghai
Province, like Jamyang Kyi and Notreng (Rno sbreng), a
secular intellectual and former monk. This indicates the
significance of ethical reform as a fulcrum for debate over
the role of religion in the public sphere, extending well
beyond the locus of its implementation. In what follows,
I carry out a survey and close reading of these blog posts
to identify the key points of debate and the rhetorical
strategies used by bloggers in critiques and defenses of
the new ten virtues. Specifically, I analyze the secular
terms through which clerical authority is criticized in the
Tibetan blogosphere and several responses to this critique
that address the polarizing tendency of online debate due
to the circulation of misinformation and slander.
Secular critiques of the new ten virtues in the Tibetan
blogosphere constellate around individual rights and freedom in raising the following issues: the perceived compulsory nature of the new ten virtues, the economic hardship
for nomads of not selling livestock for slaughter, the need
for free speech in public forums and fear of reprisals for
speaking out against monastic authorities, and the harsh
penalties reported for violators. An anticlerical tenor is
evident in a number of blog posts that raise the specter
of priestly corruption while challenging the authority of
clerics to impose penalties on the laity and refuse them
religious services. Yet it is notable that bloggers in this debate rarely question Buddhist values writ large or even the
specific precepts of the new ten virtues—with the exce tion of not selling one’s livestock for slaughter.22 Instead,
they focus on the implementation of the new ten virtues,
criticizing the methods of punishing transgressors and by
extension the scope of monastic authority. This bracketing
off of Buddhist values may indicate a predicament on the
part of bloggers who seek to resist the dominance of Buddhism in Tibetan society while also demonstrating their

loyalty to Tibetan culture. The anticlerical rhetoric on the
Tibetan blogosphere has certain resonances with Chinese
secularism, yet is by no means a matter of towing the party
line. Bloggers on both sides of the debate over ethical reform are fiercely loyal to the common cause of preserving
Tibetan culture and ethnic unity, while disagreeing about
whether Buddhist ethical reform helps or harms that common cause. Indeed, the taint of communism—or the ‘red
taint’ (dmar po’i dri ma) as one blogger puts it—is expressly
used in a pejorative sense to discredit one’s opponent and
ironically happens on both sides of the debate as illustrated in examples discussed below. This smear tactic is made
possible by the relative anonymity of bloggers using pen
names.
In terms of the role of digital technology in the process,
it is clear that: (a) the debate has been incident-based,
sparked by discrete events reported and disseminated
rapidly through provocative anecdotes and images shared
on social media and blogs, and (b) opinion pieces are
hastily forged in response to these events and circulate
online based, for the most part, on second- and third-hand
accounts rather than personal testimonials or sustained
research. As a result, hearsay and hyperbole have been
able to flourish, what one monastic blogger refers to as an
“endemic cycle of inciting discord.”23 As I argue in what
follows, the incident-based nature of this debate, structured around a series of provocations, tends to obscure the
substantive issues of ethical reform, particularly the economic hardship to nomads of not being able to sell their
livestock for slaughter. In tracing the arc of this online
debate during its liveliest year, starting in November 2012,
I chart the specific issues raised and the secular terms in
which both the critique and defense of ethical reform are
articulated. Following Campbell’s line of inquiry, I suggest
that the online critique of clerical authority discloses a
noteworthy, but circumscribed, leveling function of the
Tibetan blogosphere.
Leveling of Authority in Tibetan Cyberspace?
As a starting point, it is important to acknowledge that
Tibetan-language blogging websites have provided a novel
and significant space for secular critiques of the role of
religion in Tibetan society. Such criticisms are generally
taboo among Tibetans and marginalized to the realm of
gossip, even though there has been an outspoken group
of Amdo intellectuals based in the Chinese cities of Xining
and Lanzhou, who decry the influence of religion on Tibe an society and seek to create a new secular culture. This
group of ‘new thinkers’ have incubated their ideas under
the influence of Western philosophy and the May 4th

Movement in China. The best known among them, writing
under the pen name of Shokdung (Zhogs dung), regards
religious belief as an ‘old and decaying tendency’ (bag chags
rnying rul) that needs to be shed in order for Tibetans to
modernize (Hartley 2002; Wu Qi 2013: 222–31). Secular
intellectuals and bloggers can and do take real social risks
in raising critiques of religion in a public forum, whether
it be a newspaper, literary journal, or blogging website,
particularly if they are well-known writers who cannot
easily hide behind a pen name. The risk in criticizing clerics can be attributed in part to the traditional respect for
Buddhist leaders, whether reincarnate lamas (sprul sku) or
cleric-scholars (mkhan po), in Tibetan society. But it is also
as an effect of more than sixty years of domination by the
Chinese Communist state, whereby criticism of Buddhism
can easily be misconstrued as a treacherous assault on
Tibetan culture, already under siege. For this reason, those
who criticize Buddhism online can be subjected to harsh
comments.
Acknowledging the importance of Tibetan blogs in providing a space for social critique does not necessarily imply
that the Internet fosters the democratization of authority, religious or otherwise. In addressing this issue, we
must take into account the digital divide, characterized
by greater access to the Internet in urban areas of China
and exacerbated by low literacy rates among Tibetans in
rural and nomadic areas. Even among educated Tibetans
in China, many have completed their education beyond
primary school in Chinese-medium schools and thereby
have insufficient knowledge of literary Tibetan to read and
write at an advanced level. Composing Tibetan literature
has always been an elite practice, once the purview of
monastics and the aristocracy, and now shared by Tibetans who have studied at minority universities in cities like
Chengdu, Lanzhou, Xining, Lhasa and Beijing. Although
writing a blog post may not require literary talent as such,
apart from the proliferation of poetry and short stories
online, it does still require strong writing skills. Further
exacerbating the digital divide is the ‘great firewall’ of Ch na, already mentioned, which impedes the transnational
flow of discourse through blocking routine access to exile
Tibetan blogs and new websites, though VPNs and proxy
servers are available.24
The rise of Tibetan literary journals in the mid-1980s
and the space they opened for self-expression and social
critique among Tibetan intellectuals in the post-Mao era
is well documented (Shakya 2008; Rabgey 2008), but the
effects of the digital revolution on Tibetan writing has
received less attention. There have been several targeted articles about the tragedy of self-immolations on the
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Tibetan plateau as debated on exile Tibetan blogs (Rekjong
2012; Tsering 2012) and as expressed in coded fashion
through poetry on Tibetan-language blogging websites
in China (Robin 2012). More comprehensive studies to
date on Tibetan uses of the Internet have been limited to
Chinese-language websites (Rabgey 2008; Terrone 2010b)
and exile websites and bulletin boards in English (Bray
2000; Brinkerhoff 2012; Helland 2014). Though rarely thematized in these studies, the linguistic register of online
usage is important as Tibetans prefer their own language
for certain topics, such as internal debates, potentially to
avoid the gaze of outsiders.25 Proliferating since the mid2000s, Tibetan-language blogs have expanded the space
for self-expression and social critique among educated
Tibetans in China with more diverse content and less
editorial restrictions than literary journals. Even so, once
posted, the possibility of censorship and reprisals looms.
Controversial posts can and do get removed after they gain
widespread readership and come to the attention of state
regulating authorities, including the blog posts by Jamyang
Kyi and Notreng which sparked the two phases of online
debate over the new ten virtues in November 2012 and
August 2013 respectively.26
At a pioneering workshop on Defining Tibetan Cyberspace
held at Columbia University in May 2015, scholars reflected
on the degree to which digital media serve a democratizing
or leveling function among Tibetans. Lama Jabb (Bla ma
skyabs) emphasized that Tibetan cyberspace is multivocal
and multilingual with no single authority holding the power to control meaning and representations, while Gedun
Rabsal (Dge ‘dun rab gsal) pointed out that Tibetan intellectuals, students and monastics can exchange opinions on
relatively equal footing given the lack of social hierarchy
in the layout of blogs. Popular blogging sites like Amdo
Tibet Blog, New Youth Network, Gendun Chöpel Literary Network
and the exile Khabdha are arranged in sections by topic,
and the posts within each section are typically listed according to date or popularity.27 This means that the layout
of blogs contributes to an online leveling of hierarchies by
not privileging specific categories of contributors. Non theless, markers of difference are evident in the photos
and names of bloggers, which may indicate monastic or lay
status as well as the gender of the author or commenter.
In addition, the writing style of a given blogger (including grammar and spelling) signals their level of erudition
and can influence the authority granted by readers to the
opinions expressed in their blog posts. At the workshop,
Françoise Robin pointed to the low presence of female
Tibetan writers online (less than 5% of bloggers) and gave
examples of gendered criticisms and sexual harassment in
comments on blog posts by women, which discourage their
26 | HIMALAYA Spring 2016

participation.28 Thus blogs as a medium for Tibetan writing
can serve to both level and reinforce hierarchies that are
operative in offline contexts.
New social media platforms, such as Weibo (a microblogging site) and WeChat (an instant messaging mobile app)
are more democratic than blogs, since video and voice
features allow for greater participation among populations
with low literacy.29 However, as Lauran Hartley cautioned
at the Defining Tibetan Cyberspac workshop, the popularity of Weibo and WeChat runs the risk of diminishing the
online space for debate. Self-selection into affinity-based
groups and the constraints on the amount of text on newer
platforms means that opinions cannot be exchanged in
much depth and communication is restricted to those
who likely already share a similar perspective on issues.
Yet even with the rise of Weibo and WeChat, the online
debate over ethical reform on Tibetan-language blogging
websites sustained the attention of numerous writers
and thousands of readers over the course of a year. The
bloggers who contributed spoke largely in secular terms as
part of a new educated elite able to challenge the authority
of religious figures in Tibetan society. With the exception
of the prominent female writer Jamyang Kyi, most of the
bloggers on this topic appear to be male, in line with the
more general pattern of male-dominance in the Tibetan
blogosphere. Overall, there have been more critiques of
the new ten virtues than defenses published, though several defenses have been put forward, including at least two
by monastics.
The cleric-scholar spearheading ethical reform, Khenpo
Tsultrim Lodrö, has not responded directly online—though
some of his oral remarks were posted to Khabdha in January 2016—despite having a strong web presence on Weibo
and other microblogs.30 When I asked him about this point
in April 2015, the Khenpo stated that his ideas can be found
in his published writings and speeches, so he feels no need
to respond online.31 Certainly his statement could be read
as a rationalization to avoid dialogue with critics of the
new ten virtues. Yet implicit in his statement may also be
a relative valuation of modes of writing—the text being
more authoritative than the blog. His hesitation to engage
in the online blogosphere debate, whatever the rationale, calls into question the degree to which the Tibetan
blogosphere can bring about a leveling function that would
place those on both sides of the debate on equal footing.
Buddhist leaders can remain aloof by opting not to participate in blogosphere debates, while Tibetan nomads are
underrepresented owing to low literary rates. While a new
elite of educated Tibetans avail themselves of the relatively unregulated space of the blogosphere to exchange ideas

and the recent post quoting Tsultrim Lodrö (discussed at
the end of this article) indicates that he has been paying
attention to online critiques, it is unclear whether the
nomads who are most affected by the new ten virtues can
and do tune in.
Shutting the Dharma Doo
Though not the first blog post on the topic, what sparked
the online controversy over the new ten virtues was a series of four incidents, described by the well-known blogger
Jamyang Kyi and published on 4 November 2012. Jamyang
Kyi publishes under the pen name Minduk (Smin drug)
and was a regular contributor to the blogging site Sangdhor
before it was closed down. Titled “Incidents Connected to
the Ten Virtues Code,”32 her blog post recounts in brief
but vivid terms a series of four incidents involving harsh
punishments to violators of the new ten virtues. Giving
her blog post the quality of a report from the field, each
incident is described in a short paragraph including the
name of the individual and their clan. Jamyang Kyi refrains
from comment and simply offers the incidents up to the
scrutiny of her readers. Here is a translation of the most
cited from the series, which shows the tenor of her blog
post and the issues highlighted therein:
A man named Ramang Pema (Rwa mang Pad ma)
from the Shotsang clan (Zho tshang gi tsho ba) sold
off his livestock thereby transgressing the [ten]
virtues code. Because of this, the dharma door was
shut on him. Afterwards, one of his children died.
He asked many times for the dharma door to be
opened, but it did not open. In the end, not a single
lama or monk arrived [to conduct a funeral] and, in
anguish, he threw the child’s corpse into a river.33
In her account, Jamyang Kyi uses the term, ‘shut the dharma door’ (chos sgo rgyab), to indicate the denial of religious
services to those who transgress their vows to adhere
to the new ten virtues. Later in this article I will discuss
responses to this and other issues raised by her blog post.
For now, let us imagine the shock and dismay for Tibetan
readers of someone being denied religious services for the
funeral of a family member, with potentially devastating
consequences for his or her future rebirth, as a result of
the once-typical nomadic activity of selling livestock for
slaughter. The other incidents she chronicles raise equally
troubling issues, including fines exacted for violations,
forcible confessions, and banishment. Whether or not
these accounts are accurate—and verifying them would
be difficult due to the limited information provided—they
struck a chord online, and the readership of her post grew
steadily over the year after its initial publication.

The wide circulation and overwhelming response to this
post—with 9,700 views and 524 comments—shows the
power of mediated witnessing in the digital age, whereby
electronic media allow for certain types of stories and
images to rapidly circulate and provoke either dismay or
disbelief. In regimes of censorship, electronic media provide a crucial outlet for sharing information that otherwise
does not circulate through mainstream news sources,
which in China are state controlled. For example, the
Chinese-language blog by dissident Tibetan writer Woeser
(‘Od zer), Invisible Tibet (Mthong mi thub pa’i bod, woeser.
middle-way.net) which uses a server outside of China,34
provided essential information on the protests that swept
across the Tibetan plateau from March 2008 in the lead up
to the Beijing Olympics. Woeser continues to post information about sensitive and typically censored material,
including protests, arrests, self-immolations, disasters, discrimination targeting Tibetans in China, and the impacts
of state policy in Tibetan areas. In Jamyang Kyi’s blog post
“Incidents Connected to the Ten Virtues Code,” while it is
monastic rather than state dominance that is being challenged, its credibility relies on the new and valued role of
the dissident blogger in Tibetan society. A personal friend
of Woeser, Jamyang Kyi is a former television newscaster
and journalist, who became better known as a popular
singer in the late 1990s and as a feminist writer and public
intellectual in the mid-2000s.35 In 2008, she was jailed for
sending text messages with information about the protests
in Ngawa and later blogged about the harsh treatment she
endured during her two months of incarceration.36 Augmenting her standing, the writings of both these prominent female bloggers is disseminated via High Peaks, Pure
Earth, a English-language website that publishes translations from Tibetan and Chinese of politically penetrating
essays, songs and news by and about Tibetans in China.
Another critique of the new ten virtues on Sangdhor followed two days after Jamyang Kyi published her account
of these four incidents. The main issue that she surfaced,
the harsh punishments for violators of the new ten virtues,
and the language of shutting the dharma door was picked
up and elaborated on by another blogger named Chakrom
(‘Khyags rom).37 Referencing Jamyang Kyi by name as a ‘famous writer’ and repeating the account translated above,
Chakrom further questioned the nature of punishments
raised by her initial post. In particular, he queried why
the ten virtues are referred to as tradition (srol rgyun) but
implemented as if they were law (khrims), which can also
mean ‘regulation’ or ‘code.’ In his estimation, a tradition is
something voluntarily upheld by ordinary people without
penalty or force, whereas a law is something imposed from
above that requires punishment in order to gain compliHIMALAYA Volume 36, Number 1 | 27

ance. In its presentation by Larung Buddhist Academy, the
new ten virtues are indeed referred to as tradition, harkening back to well-known antecedents of the canonical ten
Buddhist virtues as well as the sixteen ‘human mores’ (mi
chos) attributed to the seventh-century Tibetan emperor
Songtsen Gampo (Srong btsan sgam po).38 The ideological
work done by Tsultrim Lodrö in his short treatise, An Explanation of the Ten Virtues Tradition,39 is precisely to ground
the innovation of the new ten virtues in traditional Buddhist ethics. Nonetheless, in the summer of 2014, I heard
the new ten virtues colloquially referred to as a regulation,
code or law (dge bcu’i khrims), even when discussed positively in reference to the decline in local crime. Whether
viewed as tradition or regulation, the implementation of
the new ten virtues has become a focal point of debate due
to incidents reported regarding harsh punishments for
violators.
In his blog post, Chakrom also points to the economic
hardship for nomads who lose their main source of income
by vowing not to sell livestock for slaughter. In his estimation, the imposition of economic hardship contradicts the
pure motivation (kun slong gtsang ma) expected of monks in
benefitting sentient beings. Implicitly, he accuses monks
of not caring enough about the fate of nomads, and he is
not alone in this. Apart from the imposition of fines and
punishments, the economic impact on nomads is a key
point of contention as the new ten virtues spread beyond
Serta to neighboring nomadic areas, though it tends to get
overshadowed on the Tibetan blogosphere by the disturbing reports about the implementation of ethical reform. In
fact, well before the issue of penalties arose, an anonymous
blogger had already pointed out the economic hardship to
nomads in a blog post dated to 5 November 2011 on Amdo
Tibet Blog.40 In a list of ‘ten great disappointments’ (blo pham
chen po bcu) in relation to the new ten virtues, this blogger
expressed concern over economic decline in nomadic areas
as well as the threat to the nomadic way of life. He states,
“Without concern for ordinary people’s living conditions
and long-term future, lamas and tulkus impose various
Buddhist regulations on the faithful masses (dad ldan mang
tshogs), threatening to eliminate Tibetan nomadism with
its thousand-year history” (Anonymous, 5 November
2011). It is noteworthy that this anonymous blogger is the
only critic in the debate (among the posts I located) who
presents himself as an eyewitness to the effects of ethical reform. The blogger self-identifies as someone from
Washul Serta (Dbal shul Gser rta), combining clan and
place name, writing anonymously out of fear of reprisal.
Not only are Buddhist teachers seen as lacking sufficient
concern for Tibetans by critics of ethical reform, Tibet-
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ans are also disparaged for their blind faith, which is also
the term for superstition (rmongs dad) in Tibetan. The
anonymous blogger on Amdo Tibet Blog speaks of the ‘bad
custom’ (goms srol ngan pa) of Tibetans who listen to the
advice of lamas and believe them rather than improving
their own standard of living. This same rhetoric can be
found in another post on Sangdhor several months later
on 16 May 2013 by blogger Ser Munsel (Gser mun sel) who
expressed dismay over the handling of violations by lamas
and monks and concern over the ensuing controversy as
a threat to Tibetan unity.41 This blogger casts the new ten
virtues as an unnecessary burden on the laity due to monastic regulation, the suppression of dissent, and expulsion
of transgressors from the moral community tied to local
monasteries. In line with the views of ‘new thinkers,’ for
Ser Munsel, this amounts to corruption that preys on the
“blind faith in the mindstream of the masses” and a “gullibility in the national character of our Tibetan people.”42
Despite the anticlerical tenor of his critique, Ser Munsel
expresses concern that the contentious nature of the new
ten virtues and its implementation could create serious
mistrust towards monks and doubts about the monastic
system more generally. This implies this blogger’s overall
support for the monastic system with criticism reserved
for its excesses.
Anticlerical Rhetoric among Secular Critics
Anticlerical rhetoric constitutes a strong thread in the
secular critique of the new ten virtues in the Tibetan
blogosphere. This comes out clearly in Jamyang Kyi’s
second blog post on the topic, titled “The Impact of the
Ten Virtues Code” and published on 27 November 2012
within a month of her initial post on the topic.43 Here the
central issue shifts from punishments for transgressions
to freedom of speech with religion represented as both
a repressive and regressive force in society. Jamyang Kyi
pits intellectuals (shes yon can) against religious authorities
by praising the former as defenders of freedom throughout human history and the latter as responsible for “the
oppression of rigid traditions and strict religious codes
that hinder [ordinary people’s] desires and aspirations and
curtail [freedom of] speech.”44 In this post, the intellectual
stands for progressive ideas, while the ‘holy ones’ (dam pa)
of Tibet, both reincarnate lamas and cleric-scholars, are
deemed backward, trying to consolidate their own power
to the detriment of society at large. Once again, there are
key incidents around which she constellates her critique,
the alleged suppression of dissent by Tulku Tendzin
Dargyé (Sprul sku Bstan ‘dzin dar rgyas) at a gathering of
monastics in Serta and a subsequent series of forced confessions and pledges at his monastery’s annual ceremony

to renew ethical vows. But even before describing these
events, Jamyang Kyi raises the specter of corruption on the
part of reincarnate lamas and cleric scholars—not as one or
two corrupt individuals but categorically in an anticlerical
vein—whom she accuses of “paying lip service to religion,
while engaging in rotten behavior that is bound up internally in self-interest.”45 Tendzin Dargyé is then introduced by way of these incidents in order to instantiate her
sweeping claims about history in general and hindrances
to progress for Tibetans in particular.
This type of secular criticism relies on the trope of priestly corruption that has a distinctive genealogy in Chinese
secularism and casts Buddhist clerics as willfully misleading the faithful Tibetan masses.46 Anticlericalism is
deeply embedded in Chinese secularism, starting with the
secularizing campaigns to destroy temples and convert
them to schools from the late Qing through the Republican era (Ashiwa 2009; van der Veer 2011, 2013). By the
Maoist period, this anticlerical ideology culminated in the
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) with its rampant destruction of religious institutions and persecution of religious
figures alongside other elites in struggle sessions. Blog sphere critiques of ethical reform today routinely bleed
into slanderous remarks that bear a strikingly resemblance
to the Republican Era press characterizations of clerics as
cunning and sexually debauched, misleading the illiterate and gullible masses (van der Veer 2011: 273). I have
already mentioned the language of misleading the gullible
masses in Ser Munsel’s blog post. With respect to sexual
debauchery, the anonymous blogger from Serta accuses
the Buddhist clerics spearheading the new ten virtues of
imposing a strict ethical code on ordinary Tibetans while
duplicitously eating meat and consorting with prostitutes
on visits to inner China (Anonymous, 5 November 2011).
This is precisely the kind of slander that tends to overshadow and detract from substantive debate.
In addition to invoking the trope of priestly corruption,
for her part, Jamyang Kyi sees the strict imposition of
Buddhist ethical norms as a kind of violence, or in her
words, “propagating Buddhism through brutality” instead
of through “non-violent activity to benefit others. 47 One
wonders here if Jamyang Kyi is intentionally drawing out
the importance of non-violence within the new ten virtues
(constituting half the precepts) to point out a hypocrisy
in implementation. This issue comes out more overtly in
a blog post discussed below, when Domé Bu (Rdo me ‘bud)
accuses monks who issue harsh penalties of abandoning
the precept of non-violence and thereby being no different
from those that they punish.48 Violence and oppression are
themes in several posts in the online debate over ethical
reform. Lamas and cleric-scholars are called “terrorists”

and characterized as wielding “influence with the bloody
stench of brutality” and leading a “religious dictatorship.”49 In portraying ethical reform as a forcible imposition on Tibetan nomads with local dissent suppressed,
Jamyang Kyi champions the role of the secular intellectual
in questioning the hegemony of religious elites. This takes
quite a bit of daring in the Tibetan context with a populace
that remains deeply devoted to Buddhist masters and readily equates criticism directed at Buddhism with conformity
to Chinese Communist Party rhetoric and disloyalty to
Tibetans as a people.
The lama implicated in the incidents described in both of
Jamyang Kyi’s blog posts is Tendzin Dargyé, the head of
Puwu Monastery in Serta, which had its own well-established ethical code for almost twenty years prior to the
new ten virtues introduced in 2008 by Larung Buddhist
Academy.50 In 2010 Tendzin Dargyé became the principal figure in implementing the new ten virtues within
Serta County by establishing the Monastic Association to
oversee the activities of the thirty monasteries in Serta,
and by serving as its chair in its initial years of operation.
When asked about the issue of free speech, Tendzin Dargyé
denied any dissent within the Monastic Association, so
one is left to wonder whether these incidents happened
as described and, if so, to what extent lamas were actively
involved in or appraised about them. This points to an
epistemic quandary for researchers and readers vis-à-vis
the reliability of information in the blogosphere, which has
not undergone a vetting or verification process 51
As a counterpoint, the blogger Bongdzi (Bong rdzi) published a critique of Jamyang Kyi’s views on 12 December
2012 in a post titled “Jamyang Kyi and the Ten Virtues
Code.”52 Though by no means a defense of the new ten virtues, he raises several cogent issues. First, since Jamyang
Kyi is an avid woman’s rights advocate, he asks why she
refuses to consider the possible benefits to women of the
ten virtue’s stance against prostitution, gambling, and
the consumption of alcohol. These are activities which,
when married men engage in them, can cause considerable harm to the family through sexually-transmitted
diseases, gambling debt, and domestic violence (though
these social problems are by no means reducible to alcohol
consumption). He also questions her implicit critique
of clerical authority as authoritarian in her initial post
regarding incidents of shutting the dharma door. In his
view, according to democratic principles, any voluntary
association can have rules, which, if violated, lead to expulsion from that association. He gives the example of sports
teams that require their players not to consume alcohol
and can expel players for non-compliance. While offering
a thought-provoking counterpoint, Bongdzi indulges in his
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share of mudslinging by referring to Jamyang Kyi as a Red
Guard (dmar srung dmag mi) who seeks to ‘destroy the old’
(rnying gtor).53 Continuing in this vein, he accuses Jamyang
Kyi of being ignorant of democratic principles and simply
spouting propaganda based on her former role as a television newscaster. As mentioned previously, association
with the ‘red taint’ of communism is an important way for
Tibetans bloggers to attempt to discredit an opponent in
online debate, an unfortunate way that public discourse
can turn into character assassination. According to Lama
Jabb, Jamyang Kyi has effectively been silenced online by
the array of negative comments and responses to her blog
posts—at least for the time being.54
Bongdzi’s blog post also points to a distinction that needs
to be made between the ethical principles encapsulated
in the new ten virtues and the methods by which they are
implemented. As already mentioned, the new ten virtues combine elements of a temperance movement with
non-violence. Grounded in the Sigālovāda Sutta, a scripture
focused on lay Buddhist morality, strictures not to drink or
gamble have been invoked in Buddhist temperance movements from Sri Lanka to Japan, endeavoring to reinstate
Buddhist values for the purpose of social uplift in contexts
of rapid modernization and/or colonialism.55 Moreover,
non-violence has been central to Tibetan articulations
of their Buddhist identity in approaching political issues
in the diaspora. While none of these precepts would be
objectionable as something voluntarily undertaken, the
question raised by secular critics has to do with coercion
and enforcement. Yet, as Bongdzi points out, the new ten
virtues in and of themselves do not prescribe a system for
implementing, let alone enforcing, these precepts with
fines and punishments for transgression. The impleme tation has been left up to individual monasteries to decide
in conjunction with local leaders as they encourage their
affiliated villages or clans to take up the new ten virtues 56
That said, the widespread implementation of the new ten
virtues through mass vows, tracked and enforced by monastery officials, introduces an element of coercion that did
not previously exist. Although households can and do opt
out of subscribing to the ten virtues, we must recognize
the potential social cost in not participating in the moral
and ritual community tied to local monasteries. Unlike
churches and denominations in North America or Europe,
where an individual or family can easily decide to change
congregation, in nomadic areas on the Tibetan plateau,
villages and clans have been affiliated with a designated
monastery for generations and cannot readily make such a
change.
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Rekindling the Fire of the Cultural Revolution
The issue of coercion resurfaces in the second round of
debate over the new ten virtues. It was set in motion by a
disturbing series of photographs posted to Weibo, showing
monks punishing thieves and gamblers at Kirti Monastery
(Ki rti dgon) in Ngawa Prefecture.57 The photographs show
young Tibetan men lined up in a monastery courtyard with
cardboard placards hanging down from their necks, naming their crimes. The placards visible in the photographs
say either thief (rkun ma) or gambler (rgyal ‘jog). The photographs are starkly reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution,
when ‘class enemies’ were publicly humiliated in struggle
sessions and their political crimes written on placards
hung from their necks. Except that in these photographs,
Buddhist monks are shown presiding over the event with
large crowds of nomads lining the courtyard as witness.
These photographs circulated via Weibo and WeChat and
the next day began to appear in the blogosphere with commentary. On 29 August 2013, no less than three blog posts
were published on separate Tibetan websites: New Youth
Network, Amdo Tibet Blog, and Khabdha.58
Though the photographs were taken at a monastery of
the Geluk tradition with no association to Larung Buddhist Academy, they were hastily associated with Tsultrim
Lodrö and the new ten virtues. An Amdo Tibet Blog post
with the title “The Offenses Accumulated by Tsul-lo and
the Propagators of the Ten Virtues” (using a nickname
for Tsultrim Lodrö)59 shows four photographs from the
Weibo series with a poignant question or comment below
each one.60 The author whose English moniker is Stray
Yak seems unaware that the events depicted took place at
Kirti Monastery and focuses his comments instead on their
resemblance to Cultural Revolution. Therein he bemoans
the current plight of Tibetans under religious regulations,
deemed stricter than state law. The main issue for this
blogger is the severity of the punishments as depicted:
“In general, gamblers are not good people, but to use such
a method [of punishment] is overly excessive. Isn’t this
offense contrary to the disciplinary code of the dharma?”
(Stray Yak, 29 August 2013). Other bloggers followed a similar line of reasoning, suggesting that the offenses by the
monks in enacting such a punishment is comparable to the
offenses being punished, equally contravening Buddhist
ethical principles.
Along these lines, a blogger on Khabdha named Domé
Bu called this incident “the resurrection of the Cultural Revolution in Tibet” in a post titled “The Ten Virtues
Code is Nearly Suffocating the Masses.”61 There he accused
the monks presiding over the event of being like ‘terrorists’ (drag spyod pa) who act contrary to the non-violence

espoused by the Buddha and thereby risk destroying the
reputation of all Buddhist clerics. Specifically, he repr mands them for mistreating ordinary people on whom
they ironically depend for support:
Recently in photographs spread on the Internet, if
you look at the mood and expression of the monastic judges, they appear to have a vindictive manner
toward those who transgressed the ten virtues as if
they had killed their own mother or father. Is this
the proper behavior of monks? In the case of Tibet,
the monastic community has the highest degree of
learning. What is there to say when they treat other
types of people around them with scorn and distain? In sum, what is the difference between good
and bad with respect to those who violate the ten
virtues and you who punish them? (Rdo me ‘bud, 29
August 2013)
In this passage, Domé Bu shares his own impressions from
viewing the images from Kirti Monastery circulating online and how they made him question the ethical behavior
of monks as moral exemplars in society. Throughout the
post, he addresses the monks involved directly, asking
them not to create more suffering for Tibetans, already
burdened by difficult living conditions.
The first commenter on his blog post echoed Domé Bu’s
concern by suggesting that monks should not interfere
with activities of the laity. In this commenter’s view, such
interference is “a form of mixing the two, religion and politics, which are contradictory and incompatible.”62 Comments of this nature invoke a reading of Tibetan history
that has become popular among the ‘new thinkers,’ who
regard Buddhism as the cause of Tibet’s decline and its susceptibility to domination by outside powers (Hartley 2002,
Wu Qi 2013). Needless to say, this view aligns with Chinese
Communist Party rhetoric that condemns the union of
religion and politics (chos srid zung ‘brel)63 under the rule
of Dalai Lamas as a “feudal serfdom under theocracy” that
relegated Tibet to “poverty, backwardness, isolation and
decline.”64 Given the multivalence of the term for politics
(srid pa), which can also mean society and the temporal
order as a whole, the blog comment to Domé Bu’s post
can also be read as a secularizing call to delimit the role of
monastics in Tibetan society. When I showed this comment
to Tsultrim Lodrö, he retorted that it is precisely the role
of monastics to interfere with the laity and benefit society
in a variety of ways—through education, moral guidance,
traditional medicine and other domains of knowledge.65
Indeed, many monasteries run schools, official and u official, for children to learn to read and write Tibetan,
and monks have also been engaged historically as Tibetan
medical doctors. Moreover, ethical extortions to the laity

have always been a mainstay monastic activity, a site
where religious values clearly bleed into social life.66 These
opposing views highlight the fact that underlying debates
about the new ten virtues is the larger question of the role
of Buddhist monastics in contemporary Tibetan society
and, as a corollary, the scope of clerical authority.
The third post on August 29th offers one of the most sustained and cogent critiques of ethical reform, asking in its
title: “Who is Rekindling the Fire of the Cultural Revolution?”67 One of the photos from Weibo, with a row of young
Tibetan men bearing placards stating their crimes, occupied the top portion of the blog post, clearly prompting
the question in its title. The post was written by Notreng,
a former monk who joined the ranks of ‘new thinkers’ in
viewing Buddhism as detrimental to freedom and progress;
he is also the founder of the website New Youth Network on
which this post was published.68 In the strong anticlerical
language of this post, Notreng accuses Tsultrim Lodrö and
his associates of establishing a ‘religious dictatorship’ (chos
lugs pa’i sger gcod) in nomadic areas. His critique focuses on
what he perceives to be the compulsory nature of ethical
reform, enacted through coercion and fines, which he
compares to placing a yoke on the Tibetan masses. For this
reason, Notreng advocates persuasion over enforcement
and champions freedom of choice. Addressing Buddhist
clerics directly, he states:
In general, whether or not someone liberates their
livestock or whether or not they give up eating
meat is their own individual affair. This [right]
should not be plundered by a dharma association
or other authority. However, you speak of love and
compassion and at the same time covertly establish
taxes. If we don’t call something like this ‘dictatorship,’ what do we call it? If it’s not the spirit of
the Cultural Revolution, what is it? (Rno sbreng, 29
August 2013)
Although he seems to conflate the new ten virtues with
vegetarianism, his basic point is that not selling yak for
slaughter and not eating meat should be a matter of individual choice rather than mandated by religious authorities. To clarify, the new ten virtues promulgated by Larung
Buddhist Academy asks nomads not to sell their livestock
for slaughter, but does not forbid slaughtering livestock
for one’s own consumption and does not mention vegetarianism, though Tsultrim Lodrö is also a strong advocate
for vegetarianism. For that reason, these issues tend to get
conflated online
In this post, Notreng ties freedom of choice to the economic implications of adopting the new ten virtues, asking how
nomads can survive, let alone pay medical and educational
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bills, while being asked to give up their principal means
of income. He puts the predicament poignantly as follows:
“Without selling livestock, who will pay the medical bill
to heal the problem when wife Tsomo is suffering from
illness? Who will pay the tuition for the dear son Döndrup
who is anxiously looking around the tent?”69 Tying this
economic question to the future of nomadic pastoralism
on the Tibetan plateau, he asks: “If households sell all their
livestock to be liberated, what should future generations of
nomadic masses do as a livelihood? Are you advising them
all to become monks and nuns and practice the essence of
dharma?”70 With these questions, Notreng points to the
real tension between idealized ethical standards and the
practicalities of living as a householder in nomadic areas.
While Notreng raises economic factors, the main thrust
of his opinion piece is the issue of coercion and punishments for violators of ethical reform, which seem to be the
lightening rod for the online controversy over the new ten
virtues as a whole. Regarding the photographs he saw the
day before on WeChat, as elsewhere, we get a window into
the blogger’s first impressions: “When I saw those ph tographs on WeChat of a group of robbers and gamblers
made to stand, draped with a placard around the neck, in
the middle of a crowd of ordinary people and monks, while
another was tied to a tree, my first reaction was: This is
the Cultural Revolution. This is the Catholic Inquisition” (Rno
sbreng, 29 August 2013, emphasis mine). Here one gets
a sense for the visceral moment of seeing these images,
which impelled him to call attention to the cruelty of such
a public humiliation in front of a crowd. Notably, he acknowledges that the photos were taken at Kirti Monastery
and that he is not sure if the incident is related to Tsultrim
Lodrö. This shows a certain degree of self-reflexivity lac ing in the other posts on that day, which recognizes epistemic uncertainties in relation to the origin and context of
information circulating online.
Still, there is a mismatch between the pretext for his article, the release of photos from Kirti Monastery in digital
media, and the brunt of his critique, Tsultrim Lodrö and
the new ten virtues promulgated by Larung Buddhist Academy. This mismatch seems to undermine his credibility; as
one commenter put it: “No one will listen to Notreng’s lies.
This is Kirti Monastery in Ngawa. Ha ha ha!” Others followed suit in the comments to his blog post: “This is slander to our great Khenpo, who shines bright like a youthful
moon in his activities for Tibetan religion and politics (bod
kyi chos srid)” and “This is Kirti Monastery. I don’t think it
has to do with Tshul-lo. Whether or not what you’re saying
is true, you didn’t do your research well.”71 Another blog
post, several days later, by Jampal Dorjé (‘Jam dpal rdo rje)
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discusses how the photographs from Kirti Monastery have
been misused to criticize Tsultrim Lodrö and emphasizes
that bloggers should be wary of making such criticism
without knowing the facts of the situation.72
The Endemic Cycle of Inciting Discord
The few defenses published online tend to correct misinformation and attempt to provide a more balanced view
of the new ten virtues. The most systematic defense that
I found on the Tibetan blogosphere is titled “The Actual
Benefits of the Ten Virtues,” composed by a self-identifie
monastic from Serta named Yeshé Döndok (Ye shes don
rtogs) and posted on the exile-based Khabdha.73 His defense
begins by citing the rampant deforestation in Tibetan
areas and the disappearance of many wild animals from
the Tibetan plateau, such as the Tibetan antelope, wild yak,
wild ass and musk deer. This, he fears, will be the fate of
yaks and other livestock given state pressures to develop
animal husbandry for profit. Other bloggers fall on diffe ent sides of this issue. For example, Popa Thayé (Spobs pa
mtha’ yas) writes that Tibetans should protect yaks from
being sent to market and slaughtered commercially, because they have become a symbol of the Tibetan people.74
By contrast, Nyugtsé (Smyug rtse) makes the case that
raising livestock for commercial purposes will not, in and
of itself, lead to the extermination of the yak, citing the
growing numbers of chickens and pigs raised commercially
by the Chinese.75 Alongside the issue of cruelty to animals
in commercial slaughterhouses, for Yeshé Dondok and the
monastic promoters of the new ten virtues, the loss of the
yak (the male g.yag and its counterparts, the female ‘bri
and yak-cow hybrid mdzo) would spell the end of the nomadic way of life, already threatened by state resettlement
programs, and thereby the greater potential for assimilation to Chinese language and culture in urban settings.
Yeshé Döndok’s blog post goes a long way toward dispelling misinformation about the new ten virtues. He
emphasizes the voluntary nature of engagement by
describing how monastics conduct a vote and that those
who decline to participate are not threatened or driven
out of town. Moreover, the punishments are only for those
households who decide to participate, take the vows, and
later breach them. Offline, Tsultrim Lodrö made a similar
point: that decisions on whether or not to undertake vows
associated with the new ten virtues are made household
by household, with a certain percentage of households
declining to participate in each area.76 In line with what
the Khenpo has told me,77 Yeshé Döndok states that any
fines assigned for violating the ten virtues are dedicated
to community facilities, such as schools, expressly not to

be used to support the living expenses of monastics or
monastery building projects, unless they involve facilities
designed specifically for the laity, such as circumamb latory temples (skor khang). Describing the more tangible
benefits, Yeshé Döndok cites a notable decline in three
areas: banditry at mountain passes in nomadic areas, loss
of family wealth due to gambling, and fighting over the
grasslands. Admitting that abuses in the implementation
of the new ten virtues are possible,78 Yeshé Döndok also
warns against spreading rumors without first investigating
their claims.
In response to the second wave of criticism, in a post titled
“Redressing Tsultrim Lodrö,” a monk named Goyön (Sgo
yon) overtly calls for a more balanced discussion with
regard to the new ten virtues.79 His blog post was published on the Gendun Chöpel Literary Network on 17 September 2013, within a month of the online circulation of the
photographs from Kirti Monastery discussed above, and
garnered more than two thousand readers. Goyön begins
his opinion piece by warning of the dangers of criticizing
a ‘cultural icon’ (rig gnas kyi brda mtshon) like Tsultrim
Lodrö in whom many have high esteem and faith, which
runs the risk of “severely damaging and shattering the
society’s faith.”80 A self-confessed early critic of the new
ten virtues, Goyön decided to write his defense in order to
take a stand against the “endemic cycle of inciting discord”
and advocate for more respectful and balanced online
debate, especially with regards to those who have made
a valuable contribution to Tibetan culture and society. In
the extreme, Goyön points out that the Khenpo has been
accused of having a “red taint,” being a “dictatorial and
authoritarian propagator of the [Buddhist] teachings” and
a “custodian of the remnants of the Cultural Revolution,”
and “causing the ruin of Tibetan society and impediments
to Tibetan livelihood.”81 In his review of various forms of
slander, once again we can see that the main way to discredit an opponent in debate in the Tibetan blogosphere
is to associate him or her with the ‘red taint’ of communism—an ironic accusation for a Buddhist leader to say
the least. As others before him, Goyön asks his readers to
distinguish between the content of the new ten virtues and
the excesses in its implementation, rather than blaming
everything on Tsultrim Lodrö in such virulent terms.
Along similar lines, Tsultrim Lodrö has emphasized that
critics of the new ten virtues tend to point fingers at
people rather than shed light on substantive issues. As he
said offline, regarding Jamyang Kyi and other blogosphere
critics of the new ten virtues, “they focus on the person;
they don’t focus on [their] endeavors.”82 In other words,
the debate devolves to finger-pointing and criticizing

particular individuals, largely the Khenpo himself. He continued, “On the Internet, all kinds of things are said: a lot
of accusations made and criticisms waged.”83 But he avers
that this is done without much understanding or research:
“These days, many who present criticism don’t understand
the situation with regard to clerics. They write and post on
the Internet without doing research.”84 Examples he mentioned include the mistaken conflation of the Kirti Mona tery photographs with the new ten virtues and a blog post
by Jamyang Kyi about vegetarianism, which claims that
the Khenpo is forcing nomads to become vegetarian to
the great detriment of pregnant women and fetal health.85
Yet, from his speeches in Healing Medicine for Our Times, it
is clear that the Khenpo mainly encourages monks and
nuns to become vegetarian, while asking the laity to give
up meat only twice a month and on special holy days.86
This shows how misinformation, alongside mudslinging,
proliferates online.
Overall, Goyön hails Tsultrim Lodrö as as a ‘twenty-first
century monk’ (dus rabs nyer gcig pa’i grwa ba) attempting to
revitalize Tibetan culture and improve people’s standard
of living. Toward the end of his lengthy post, he reviews
the Khenpo’s major accomplishments to date, including
initiating a vegetarian movement directed primarily at
monastics, campaigning to ban fur on the trims of traditional Tibetan coats, working to preserve the Tibetan language by creating a dictionary with neologisms in Tibetan
for modern terms,87 and campaigning for AIDS education
and prevention for Tibetans. Notably, the Khenpo’s efforts
to discourage wearing fur preceded the 14th Dalai Lama’s
speech at the 2006 Kālacakra, which prompted fur-burnings across the Tibetan plateau,88 and his promotion of
vegetarianism began several years before the 17th Karmapa made his appeal for vegetarianism at the 2007 Kagyu
Mönlam in Bodh Gaya, India.89 The Khenpo’s mobilization
efforts on myriad fronts have had a tremendous impact,
rendering him a leading cleric-scholar on the Tibetan plateau. The inauguration of the new ten virtues is thus just
one of several movements that the Khenpo has spearheaded, suggesting that ethical reform remains in service of a
broader agenda to preserve and reform aspects of Tibetan
culture in response to rapid social change, such as increasing prostitution and the threat of AIDS. For this reason,
Katia Buffetrille is perhaps too hasty in dubbing ethical
reform as “an emergent Tibetan Buddhist fundamentalism” in her discussion of vegetarianism (2015: 113). This
characterization runs counter to the Buddhist modernist
perspective in writings by Tsultrim Lodrö and his predecessor, Jigmé Phuntosk, as I have argued elsewhere (Gayley
2011, 2013).90
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Indeed, in his attempt to synthesize religious and secular
values in his 2004 work, Timely Advice: A Mirror that Illuminates the Two Systems,91 Tsultrim Lodrö exhibits a modernist sensibility in orienting Buddhist practice towards
a this-worldly rationalized system of ethics. In this work,
which provides the ideological underpinnings of the new
ten virtues, religion and the secular or worldly (chos dang
‘jig rten) serve as two distinct but compatible vantage
points that the Khenpo presents on social issues pertaining to contemporary Tibetan life. For example, in arguing
against wearing fur, he makes a case from the religious
point of view that one should not harm other living creatures for either food or clothing, but especially not for the
vanity of fur trims on a traditional Tibetan coat. From the
secular vantage point, he makes an economic argument
based on the high cost of fur relative to the income of
ordinary Tibetans, alongside an environmental argument
exhibiting concern for rare species of animals whose pelts
are illegally imported into China (Tshul khrims blo gros
2003-4, vol. 2: 261–5). The implication is that a ‘lifestyle
in accord with the dharma’ (chos dang mthun pa’i ‘tsho ba)
improves one’s situation in this life and the next, such that
a single beneficial course of action becomes self-evident.
Neither capitulating to the terms of Chinese modernity
nor narrow-mindedly asserting Buddhist values, in his
writings, Tsultrim Lodrö endeavors to harmonize religious
and secular values, deemed to be equally relevant to social
issues and public life.92 Following in the footsteps of his
predecessor Jigmé Phuntsok, he and other cleric-scholars
at Larung Buddhist Academy are attempting to carve out a
Buddhist vision of progress for Tibetans as a people (Gayley 2011, 2013). As one aspect of this vision, Tsultrim Lodrö
promotes the visibility of Buddhism in the public sphere
through ethical reform.
On 26 January 2016, as I was finalizing this article for pu lication, a post attributed to Tsultrim Lodrö appeared on
the exile-based Khabdha, titled “To Maintain Equanimity
is Worthwhile.”93 It quotes from a speech that the Khenpo
made at Larung Buddhist Academy, but was posted online
without his knowledge or consent. The post acknowledges
a range of criticisms found on the Internet, having to do
with the Khenpo’s broad-based activities. Two criticisms,
as noted in the translated excerpt below, have to do with
his advocacy of compassion for animals,94 though neither is
explicitly related to the ten virtues. The former references
the traditional practice of ransoming or liberating the lives
of animals, 95 and the latter refers to the standard Buddhist
precept not to kill, and only implicitly relates to the new
ten virtues in terms of the economic hardships for Tibetan
nomads who have lost their main source of income by not
selling livestock for slaughter. The post opens as follows:
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I’ve seen many things on the Internet, including numerous criticisms about me by others. Some suggest
that ransoming the lives [of animals] is mistaken.
Others suggest that creating the dictionary [of
Tibetan neologisms] is mistaken. Still others suggest
that AIDS prevention is mistaken, that it is not a
monk’s concern. Critics disapprove [in other ways]
as well. When I say that it’s not appropriate to take
the life of an animal, there are even cleric-scholars
and monks who repudiate me, stating that it’s necessary to allow slaughter (Tshul khrims blo gros, 26
January 2016).
One wonders here if the Khenpo is responding to a recent
critique by Pema Tsering, a cleric-scholar from Lhasa,
which has circulated via WeChat since 24 July 2015 and
was published in translation on High Peaks, Pure Earth on
19 January 2016.96 Pema Tsering characterizes the new ten
virtues as a movement informed by a “dictatorial sentiment” (sger gcod kyi bsam pa) without adequate consideration of the economic or living conditions (dpal ‘byor
gnas, ‘tsho gnas) of Tibetan nomads. As others before him,
he criticizes monastic implementation of ethical reform
through collecting signature and enforcing punishments,
citing specifically “threats [that] involve the possibility
of cutting out all relationships with local monasteries
including the performance of funeral rites.”97 His critique
rehearses a number of points that I have traced throughout this article, yet Pema Tsering constructs his case far
more cogently and with greater civility than others. In
a less common stance, he also critiques the traditional
practice of liberating yak, popularized in recent years by
numerous Tibetan lamas but for which Tsultrim Lodrö is
particularly well-known.98 Pema Tsering cites the potential
for overgrazing on the grasslands given the current fragility of Tibetan ecosystems. Overall his critique is well formulated, significantly advancing the discussion, yet it repeats
a common error: that the new ten virtues forbid Tibetans
from slaughtering livestock for their own consumption.
One wonders if this incongruity is the result of misinformation circulating on the Internet or if Tibetan nomads on
the ground are getting a different message than initially
set forth in the 2008 formulation of the new ten virtues.
In his remarks, Tsultrim Lodrö concludes by cautioning
his audience against emotionality (chags sdang) and harsh
speech (tshig ngan) that foments debate, asking them to
maintain unity (mthun sgril), non-sectarianism (ris med),
and equanimity (btang snyoms). What he does not do, given
that the Khenpo did not intend for his remarks to appear
online, is address the substantive issue of economic losses
to Tibetan nomads from not selling livestock for slaughter.

Conclusion
In this article, I have surveyed the main concerns expressed in the online controversy over Buddhist ethical
reform in the Tibetan blogosphere, focused on the liveliest
year of debate. As we have seen, these concerns are predominantly secular in nature, having to do with perceived
infringements on individual rights and freedom, such
as the potentially coercive nature of ethical reform, the
severity of penalties for transgressors, and the economic impact on nomadic households with limited means of
livelihood. I have argued that the latter concern tends to
get overshadowed by the provocative incidents involving
penalties, which sometimes prove to bear no relation to
the new ten virtues. While the Tibetan-language blogosphere opens up a novel and significant space for the
secular critique of Buddhist clerical authority, it only partially serves a leveling function in Heidi Campbell’s terms.
This is due to the digital divide favoring online access for
educated Tibetans living in urban settings and exacerbated by the ‘great firewall’ of China that creates a barrier to
transnational discourse. Who is missing from this blogosphere debate? While monastics have participated, the
figureheads of ethical reform, Tsultrim Lodrö and Tendzin
Dargyé, have not engaged (of their own accord) in online
debates, undermining the democratizing potential of the
blogosphere. While women have also participated, especially in commenting, the most prominent female voice in
the debate, Jamyang Kyi, fell silent in the wake of negative
comments. In conspicuously short supply have been Tibetan nomads from regions where the ten virtues are being
implemented. Except for the anonymous blogger from
Serta, most other bloggers have reported or responded to
stories heard, blog posts read, or images seen on Weibo
and WeChat. The debate over the new ten virtues would
be greatly enriched by a diversity of voices, especially
those who experience its effects firsthand. Ethical reform
has controversial features with high stakes for the future
of the nomadic way of life on the Tibetan plateau, yet as
Goyön cautions, a more balanced picture is needed, one
that elucidates the complexities of its ideological underpinnings, modes of implementation, and ongoing effects
in nomadic areas of Kandze Prefecture where it has mainly
spread. Given the prevalence of misinformation and mudslinging, whether the Tibetan blogosphere can become a
forum for more constructive and substantive debate on
this issue remains to be seen.
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Endnotes
1. In “Newtibet.com: Citizenship as Agency in a Virtual
Tibetan Public,” a pioneering study of Tibetan blogs,
Tashi Rabgey (Bkra shis rab dga’) charts the rise and
fall of newtibet.com, a Chinese-language blog that selfconsciously styled itself for Tibetan users as a public forum
for “the social critique of contemporary Tibet” (2008:
334). In “Fire, Flames and Ashes: How Tibetan Poets Talk
about Self-Immolations without Talking about Them,”
Françoise Robin analyzes how Tibetans use coded language
to represent and reflect on the escalating phenomenon
of self-immolations in poetry on the Tibetan blogosphere
(2012).
2. For example, popular news and blogging sites that are
blocked in China include the blogging site Khabdha (Kha
brda, <khabdha.org>) and new sites such as Phayul (Pha
yul, <phayul.com>) and the Tibet Times (Bod kyi dus bab,
<tibettimes.net>) as tested on 26 October 2015 using <en.
greatfire.org , which includes a list of past reports dating
back to 2012.
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3. See two short articles about online debates over selfimmolation on exile websites by Dhondup Tashi Rekjong
(Rig ‘byung Don grub bkra shis) in the April 2012 issue
of Cultural Anthropology Online on “Self-Immolation as
Protest in Tibet,” edited by Carole McGranahan and Ralph
Litzinger (2012), and by Chung Tsering (Chung tshe ring) in
the December 2012 issue of Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, edited
by Katia Buffetrille (2012).

11. This list comes from a handout on “The Tradition of
Ten Virtues Promulgated by Serta Larung” (Gser ljongs bla
ma rung gis gtan la phab pa’i dge bcu’i lugs srol) dated to the
earth rat year (2008–2009). There is also a text of the same
name which explains the new ten virtues (see ‘Phrin las c.
2010). I would like to express my appreciation to Gaerrang
(Kabzung, Skal bzang) for sharing copies of the handout
and text with me.

4. See Terrone 2010b for a discussion of the Chineselanguage websites of several leading Buddhist figures
from eastern Tibet and, as a corollary, Helland 2014 for a
typology of Tibetan exile websites in English.

12. The new ten virtues bear more resemblance to the
traditional upāsaka vow and the ethical guidelines for
laity outlined in the Sigālovāda Sutta. In terms of overlap,
the four precepts related to non-violence toward animals
and humans could be viewed as an extension of the first
traditional Buddhist precept not to kill. Not consorting
with prostitutes is related to the third precept not to
engage in sexual misconduct, though traditionally the
emphasis was on adultery rather than prostitution.
Not stealing is the only precept that is identical in the
traditional and new ten virtues. Tendzin Dargyé noted that
the new ten virtues are a simplification of the traditional
ones by reducing their scope to the physical level
(interview in July 2014).

5. For more about Larung Buddhist Academy, or more
formally Serta Larung Buddhist Academy of the Five
Sciences (Gser thang bla rung dgon rig lnga’i nang bstan
slob grwa) and its founder Khenpo Jigmé Phuntsok (Mkhan
po ‘Jigs med phun tshogs), see Germano 1998, Terrone
2010a, and Gayley 2011.
6. For example, the biography of Namtrul Jigmé Phuntsok
(Nam sprul ‘Jigs med phun tshogs) and Khandro Tāré
Lhamo (Mkha’ ‘gro Tā re lha mo), who rebuilt and lived at
Nyenlung Monastery (Snyan lung dgon) in Serta, mentions
the couple giving ad-hoc vows and ethical exhortations to
the laity on ritual occasions as early as 1985 (Pad ma ‘od
gsal mtha’ yas 1997: 60–61). Meanwhile, Tulku Tendzin
Dargyé (Sprul sku Bstan ‘dzin dar rgyas), the founder of the
Monastic Association in Serta discussed below, mentioned
that his own home institution, Puwu Monastery (Phu’u
dgon), has a longstanding tradition of upholding an ethical
code among its lay constituents which he revived in the
1980s. Interview in July 2014, conducted with Padmatso
(Padma ‘tsho).
7. Mkhan po ‘Jigs med phun tshogs c. 1995. See Gayley
2011 for a study of this work, which has periodically been
republished, and the connection between ethics and
cultural preservation within it.
8. Chos rje dam pa yid bzhin nor bu dgongs pa chos dbyings
su bsdus te/ lo ‘khor gsum lon pa’i rjes dran ched bsgrigs
[Compilation Commemorating the Three Year Anniversary
since the Dissolution into Dharmadhātu of the Dharma Lord,
Wish Fulfilling Jewe : Set of two VCDs, including speeches
by Khenpo Jigmé Phuntsok and songs dedicated to his
memory]. No publication information, c. 2007.
9. Rioting was mainly focused in Lhasa, the capital city of
the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Robert Barnett discusses
the contradictory reporting on this wave of protests in the
New York Times article, “Two Realities of Tibet,” published
on March 21, 2008.
10. Elsewhere I discuss the ideological backdrop of the
new ten virtues (Gayley 2013); here I focus on debates over
its implementation on the Tibetan blogosphere.
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13. On the issue of fighting over the grasslands in nomadic
areas, see Emily Yeh 2003.
14. As of 2014, this ethical reform movement had spread
mainly in Kandze Prefecture of Sichuan Province,
including Serta, Nyarong, Drango, Tawu and Dartsedo
with limited activity in Dzachukha, Dege and Payul and
also a few pockets beyond that including Yushu in Qinghai
Province and Dzamthang in Ngawa Prefecture of Sichuan
Province. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in June 2014,
conducted with Padmatso.
15. To list just a few of his writings and transcribed
speeches with an emphasis on Buddhist ethics, see Tshul
khrims blo gros. 2003–4, 2012a and 2012b.
16. The social formations in nomadic regions of Amdo
and Kham are typically viewed as tribal groupings based
on a shared notion of common ancestry (Eckvall 1968:
28–9), whether through actual kinship or mythological
origin accounts. More specific terms for these social
formations include “clan-based tribal groups” (Horlemann
2002) and “segmentary tribal groups” (Pirie 2005),
though Horlemann suggests that territoriality supersedes
ancestral ties in these groupings. Nonetheless, I prefer
the term ‘clan’ to ‘tribe’ due to the latter’s negative
connotation and association with the primitive.
17. Interview with the current heads of the Monastic
Association, Khenpo Tsephun (Tshe phun) and Wangchuk
Tsegyur (Dbang phyug tshe ‘gyur), in June 2014, conducted
with Padmatso.

18. For example, in Jamyang Kyi’s initial post on the
topic, the fourth and final incident, involving three men
who were banished after being accused of stealing a
sacred object out of a stūpa, is dated to 2007 before the
formalization of the new ten virtues by Larung Buddhist
Academy (Smin drug, 4 November 2012). Nevertheless,
the punishment in this incident was picked up by another
blogger to stand for the new ten virtues as a whole. See
Brtan skar, 27 July 2013; this blogger also goes by the
moniker Star-R.
19. Dhondup Tashi Rekjong, 5 November 2013.
20. See <highpeakspureearth.com/2014/the-impact-ofthe-so-called-ten-virtues-by-jamyang-kyi/>, published on
22 May 2014 and accessed on 29 May 2014.
21. Given the controversial nature of the topic, several
of these blog posts were subsequently removed from
circulation. While I was able to recover the original entry
in each case, unfortunately comments are generally not
preserved on Internet archive services.
22. Gaerrang has done a study on the “slaughter
renunciation movement” as an independent phenomena
from the new ten virtues, tracing its evolution and
debates about it on the ground in the village of Rakor in
Dzamthang County. See Gaerrang 2012 and 2015.
23. Sgo yon, 17 September 2013. This could more literally
be translated “an endemic back and forth between those
who incite discord” (phun tshun dbyen dkrugs slong ba’i las
rtsom mkhan bdo ba).
24. Within China, VPNs and proxy servers can be used
to access blocked sites, but it would be difficult to assess
how many Tibetans have access to these and routinely use
them.
25. Tsering Shakya (Tshe ring shā skya), comment at
the Defining Tibetan Cyberspace workshop at Columbia
University on May 1–3, 2015.
26. Smin drug, 4 November 2012 and Rno sbreng, 29
August 2013.
27. These sites have integrated homepages featuring new
posts and menus with sections such as news (‘phrin gsar),
culture (rig gnas), education (slob gso), and literature (rtsom
rig) as well as discussion (gleng brjod) and debate (brgal
brtag). The actual names of sections vary on each blog
site, and some sites also serve as a host for the blogs of
individual writers, customized to varying degrees.
28. Françoise Robin, “The Tibetan Internet: Ladies Last?,”
presentation at the Defining Tibetan Cyberspace workshop
(2015).

29. Released in 2009, Weibo is a microblogging site that
combines elements of Twitter and Facebook, both which
are blocked in China. It is designed for publishing a small
amount of text with embedded links, images and (most
recently) video. Launched in 2011, WeChat is a mobile
phone app using text and voice messaging; it has the
capacity to share both images and videos to a circle of
friends or subscribers to a public account.
30. Tsultrim Lodrö has a least four websites dedicated
to him: his micro-blog in Chinese, <www.weibo.com/
cichengluozhu>; his microblog in Tibetan, <www.weibo.
com/cclzzw#_rnd1430407427438>; his blog in Chinese,
<blog.sina.com.cn/u/1397323170>; and a website named
after his book series in Chinese, <www.huidengzhiguang.
com/index.shtml>. Thank you to Sherab Wangmo (Shes
rab dbang mo) for identifying these.
31. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in April 2015, conducted
with Dolma Kyab (Sgrol ma skyabs). The Khenpo has two
main works that provide the ideological backdrop for the
new ten virtues: Timely Advice: A Mirror that Illuminates
the Two Systems (Dus su bab pa’i gtam lugs gnyis gsal ba’i me
long) in Mkhan po Tshul khrims blo gros 2003–4 and An
Explanation of the Tradition of Ten Virtues (Dge bcu’i srol gyi
rnam gzhag) in Mkhan po Tshul khrims blo gros c. 2012b.
While publications out of Larung Buddhist Academy tend
to have a limited circulation, both these works can be
found as e-books at <www.tibetanebook.com>.
32. Smin drug, 4 November 2012. The blogging website has
since been closed.
33. Smin drug, 4 November 2012. Here I have revised the
translation provided by Dhondrup Tashi Rekjong on Tibet
Web Digest, published 5 November 2013. This incident
is also cited in ‘Khyags rom, 6 November 2012. Unless
otherwise indicated, all other translations in this article
are the result of my collaboration with Dolma Kyab, who
served as research assistant for this project.
34. According to Irina Garri’s presentation on Internet
dissent at the Defining Tibetan Cyberspac workshop
(2015), Woeser’s blogs repeatedly faced closures until
she switched to an American server. Since 2008, <woeser.
middle-way.net> has been blocked in China.
35. The dating for Jamyang Kyi’s emergence to visibility in
these various guises is thanks to a personal communication
from Françoise Robin.
36. See “’They’ By Jamyang Kyi” on High Peaks, Pure Earth
<highpeakspureearth.com/2008/they-by-jamyang-kyi>
(accessed 6 May 2015).
37. ‘Khyags rom, 6 November 2012. This post received
1202 views and 4 comments.
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38. These antecedents are mentioned in ‘Phrin las c. 2010
and Dge bcu’i srol gyi rnam gzhag in Mkhan po Tshul khrims
blo gros c. 2012b.
39. Dge bcu’i srol gyi rnam gzhag in Tshul khrims blo gros, c.
2012b.
40. Anonymous, Deng dus kyi dge bcu’i khrims gsar ba las
byung ba’i blo pham chen po bcu, posted to Amdo Tibet Blog
on 5 November 2011. Given its publication nearly a year
before Jamyang Kyi sparked a widespread online debate
on the topic, this post received a modest 317 views and 7
comments.
41. Gser mun sel, 16 May 2013. This post received 1099
views and 86 comments.
42. Gser mun sel, 16 May 2013. The Tibetan for these
phrases reads: mi dmangs mang tshogs gyi rgyud kyi rmongs
dad and nga tsho’i bod kyi blun rmongs mi rigs kyi rang gshis.
43. Smin drug, 27 November 2012. I would like to express
my appreciation to the editors of High Peaks, Pure Earth
who shared the original post with me. It initially received
1697 views and 66 comments and later gained widespread
attention due to its translation and publication on High
Peaks, Pure Earth on 22 May 2014 after the original had
disappeared from the Internet.
44. Smin drug, 27 November 2012. Translation modified
from High Peaks, Pure Earth (see note 20 above). The Tibetan
reads: gu dog pa’i sgrig srol dang/ dbang btsan pa’i chos
khrims kyi btsir gnon ‘og ‘dod ‘dun bkag cing smra sgo gcod pa...
Interestingly, Jamyang Kyi categorizes the Buddha as a
freedom-loving intellectual alongside Jesus and Socrates.
45. Smin drug, 27 November 2012. The Tibetan reads: kha
chos lugs la g.yar zhing khog rang don la bcol ba’i rul song gi bya
spyod.
46. There is also a longstanding Tibetan tradition among
iconoclastic Buddhist teachers of criticizing corruption
and hypocrisy among their own ranks.
47. Smin drug, 27 November 2012. The Tibetan for these
phrases is: gdug rtsub kyis nang chos spel and ‘tshe med gzhan
phan gyi spyod.
48. Rdo me ‘bud, 29 August 2013.
49. These phrases come from three different sources:
“terrorists” (drag spyod pa) in Rdo me ‘bud, 29 August 2013;
“influence with the bloody stench of brutality” gdug rtsub
kyi khrag dri bro ba’i kha dbang) in Smin drug, 27 November
2012; and “religious dictatorship” (chos lugs pa’i sger gcod) in
Rno sbreng, 29 August 2013.

50. The information in this paragraph primarily comes
from an interview with Tendzin Dargyé in July 2014.
51. This issue is taken up in Tashi Rabgey 2008.
52. Bong rdzi, 12 December 2012. There were 1063 readers
and 16 comments.
53. This is a reference to the Cultural Revolution campaign
to destroy the so-called ‘four olds,’ namely old ideas, old
culture, old customs, and old habits.
54. Lama Jabb, comment at the Defining Tibetan Cyberspac
workshop at Columbia University on May 1–3, 2015.
55. On the temperance movement in early twentiethcentury Sri Lanka, see Bond 1992: 61–7 and De Silva 1981:
374–8. On the Buddhist temperance association, Hanseikai,
established in 1886 during Japan’s Meiji Restoration, see
Thelle 1997: 199–202.
56. Although Tsultrim Lodrö is the ideological force
behind the new ten virtues, he is not involved in its
implementation. As he explained in an interview in April
2015, this is because Larung Buddhist Academy is an
ecumenical Buddhist institute rather than an ordinary
monastery with associated villages or clans.
57. In a comment at the the Defining Tibetan Cyberspace
workshop, Tsering Shakya mentioned that Kirti Monastery
lost a degree of popular support in the wake of this
incident and the Internet controversy it sparked.
58. The three to be discussed below are Rno sbreng, 29
August 2013; Stray Yak, 29 August 2013; and Rdo me ‘bud,
29 August 2013.
59. In Golok and surrounding regions, it is common to
call religious figures by nicknames that combine the firs
syllables of their name (in this case, Tsul from Tsultrim
and Lo from Lodrö).
60. Stray Yak, 29 August 2013. It received 2475 views and
24 comments.
61. Rdo me ‘bud, 29 August 2013. This post has 19
comments and an unknown number of readers. The
Tibetan for the cited phrase is: bod na rig gnas gsar brje
ro langs. The term ro langs is commonly used to refer to
zombies.
62. This comment was posted on 29 August 2013 by
Rgyang mig.
63. On the term, chos srid zung ‘brel, see Dung dkar blo
bzang ‘phrin las 1981 and Christoph Cüppers 2004.
64. China White Paper on “Fifty Years of Democratic
Reform in Tibet.” Beijing: Information Office of the State
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Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2009. Available
online at <http://www.china.org.cn/government/
whitepaper/2009-03/02/content_17359520.htm> (accessed
5 May 2015).
65. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in April 2015.
66. Indeed, there are numerous pre-modern treatises
arguing against drinking, smoking and gambling as well as
intermittent appeals for vegetarianism. See, for example,
Sha chang tha ma kha sogs kyi nyes dmigs phyogs bsdus (2003)
for a compilation of ethical exhortations to abandon
eating meat, drinking alcohol, and smoking tobacco. On
vegetarianism, see Shabkar Tsogdruk Rangdrol 2004 and
Geoff Barstow 2013.
67. Rno sbreng, 29 August 2013. This post received 1818
readers and 58 comments; it has since been removed.
68. Personal communication from Françoise Robin, who
kindly forwarded the link for this blog post to me.
69. Rno sbreng, 29 August 2013. The issue of how nomads
can pay for medical care if someone in their household
gets ill is an important one, raised more recently in stark
terms in a short story by Akyab Dargyé (A skyabs dar
rgyas), titled “Black Yak” (G.yag rog rog), posted to Butter
Lamp: Tibetan Literary Network (Mchod me Bod kyi rtsom
rig dra ba) on 26 March 2015. Thank you to Huatse Gyal
(Dpa’ rtse rgyal) for sharing the link for this story and to
Tsewang Dorjé (Tshe dbang rdo rje) for collaborating on
the translation of and research about this short story,
serving as the focal point of a presentation, “Black Yak:
Narrating the Economic Toll of Buddhist Ethical Reform on
Tibetan Nomads,” at Himalayan Studies Conference IV at
the University of Texas, Austin on February 25–28, 2016.
70. Rno sbreng, 29 August 2013. Liberating lives (tshe thar)
is a customary practice, whereby a fee (usually a lower
price than the market value) is paid to the owner to ensure
that the animal will never be sold for slaughter.
71. These are comments #58, #26 and #20 respectively.
72. ‘Jam dpal rdo rje, 5 September 2013.
73. Ye shes don rtogs, 26 June 2012. It had 29 comments
and an unknown number of readers.
74. Spobs pa mtha’ yas, 1 September 2013.
75. Smyug rtse, 3 September 2013.
76. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in June 2014. Also in
June 2014, the current heads of the Monastic Association,
Khenpo Tsephun (Tshe phun) and Wangchuk Tsegyur
(Dbang phyug tshe ‘gyur), showed me sheets with the
thumbprints of vow-takers for the thirty monasteries in
Serta County.

77. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in May 2011.
78. Tsultrim Lodrö made the same point in an interview
in June 2014: that there may well be shortcomings (skyon
cha) with the implementation of ethical reform, with some
monasteries doing it well and others being too extreme (ha
cang thal che).
79. Sgo yon, 17 September 2013. It had 2681 readers and 43
comments as of May 2015.
80. Sgo yon, 17 September 2013. The Tibetan for this
phrase reads: spyi tshogs gyi dad mos la phog thug dang gtor
bcom tshabs chen gtong.
81. Sgo yon, 17 September 2013. The Tibetan for these
phrases is: dmar po’i dri ma, sger gcod dbang ‘dzin gyi bstan pa
spel mkhan, rig gsar gyi lhag ma skyong mkhan, and bod mi’i
spyi tshogs la phung dkrugs dang ‘tsho bar bar chad byas.
82. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in June 2014. The
Tibetan for this statement is: kho rang tshos bya ba de la kha
gtad gin mi ‘dug/ mi la kha gtad byed gin ‘dug.
83. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in June 2014. The
Tibetan for this statement is: dra thog nas ‘dra mi ‘dra mang
po bshad gin red/ des skyon brjod mang po byas/ dgag pa mang
po brgyag.
84. Interview with Tsultrim Lodrö in June 2014. The
Tibetan for this statement is: deng sang dper na dra ba’i thogs
la gnas tshul ha ma go bar dgag pa brgyag mkhan mang po dug/
de khong tsho go tshad la zhib ‘jug ma byas par bris nas dra thog
la bzhag pa red.
85. In an interview in June 2014, Tsultrim Lodrö was
particularly animated when discussing a blog post by
Jamyang Kyi on vegetarianism (Smin drug, 24 June 2013),
which has been translated and discussed in Buffetrille
2015. The Khenpo pointed to specific passages in a
collections of his speeches, Healing Medicine for Our Times
(Dus rabs kyi gsos sman) in Mkhan po Tshul khrims blo gros
c. 2012a, that contradict her presentation of his views.
86. For examples, see the Khenpo’s speeches on “Monks,
Won’t you Consider Giving up Eating Meat?” (Dge ‘dun
pas sha rtsa ba nas mi za rgyu e yong lta dgos) in Mkhan po
Tshul khrims blo gros c. 2012a, p. 306–7 and “The Need to
Eat Less Meat” (Sha nyung za dgos) and “Request not to eat
Meat at Certain Times” (Dus tshigs la sha mi za bar skul ba)
in Mkhan po Tshul khrims blo gros c. 2012a, p. 190–1 and
218–9 respectively.
87. Rgya bod dbyin gsum gsar byung rgyun bkol ris ‘grel ming
mdzod. Chengdu: Sichuan Minorities Publishing House,
2007.
88. See Yeh 2013 on the fur-burning incidents across the
Tibetan plateau in 2006.
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89. See Gayley 2013 for more information about these
efforts by Tsultrim Lodrö.
90. Works of advice to the laity by cleric-scholars at
Larung Buddhist Academy that have a modernist bent
include: ‘Jigs med phun tshogs ‘byung gnas, c. 1995; Rig
‘dzin dar rgyas, c. 2004; Tsul khrims blo gros 2003–2004,
and Tshul khrims blo gros c. 2012.
91. Dus su bab pa’i gtam lugs gnyis gsal ba’i me long in Mkhan
po Tshul khrims blo gros 2003–2004.
92. For a robust discussion of religion and the secular by
the Khenpo, see An Examination of the Integration of Religion
and Society (Chos srid zung ‘jug la dpyod pa) in Mkhan po
Tshul khrims blo gros c. 2012b.
93. Tshul khrims blo gros, 26 January 2016. The content
was emailed to one of the Khabdha editors for posting by
someone signing as Khenchen Lama (Mkhan chen bla ma).
My thanks to Padmatso for checking with Tsultrim Lodrö
to verify that the post reflects his own oral remarks, even
though they turn out to have been shared without his
consent or knowledge.
94. I discuss the Khenpo’s advocacy of compassion for
animals in more detail in “The Compassionate Treatment
of Animals: A Contemporary Buddhist Approach in Eastern
Tibet,” forthcoming in the Journal of Religious Ethics.
95. The traditional Tibetan practice of ransoming or
liberating lives (srog blu, tshe thar), also mentioned in note
70 above, involves an animal being purchased and released
from slaughter. For livestock, they are often left with their
original owner but marked with a red ribbon to indicate
their status as liberated. As a corollary, fish are released
into a river or lake, a practice that has become particularly
popular among Han Chinese disciples of Tibetan Buddhist
teachers.
96. Pad ma tshe ring, 24 July 2015. A translation
appeared on High Peaks, Pure Earth on 19 January 2016
<highpeakspureearth.com/2016/a-reflection-on-the-so
called-ten-virtues-by-khenpo-pema-tsering> (accessed 27
January 2016).
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